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Abstract
This paper studies monetary and exchange rate policy in a world of global value chains.
Using recent microdata from Japan and Russia, devaluations are shown to negatively aect
exporters in terms of employment, domestic revenue and protability relative to nonexport-
ing rms. Given their substantial dependence on imported intermediate inputs, exporting
rms are more exposed to marginal cost shocks following exchange rate movements. Stan-
dard macro models are too simplistic in their microstructure to capture these transmission
channels. I propose a New Keynesian general equilibrium model with rm heterogeneity,
varying intermediate import intensities, and international dollar pricing to explain the nd-
ings. Strategic complementarities improve the quantitative performance of the model with-
out changing its qualitative properties. The new paradigm is successful in matching key
rm-level moments as well as the evolution of ination and net exports. JEL Codes: E52, E65,
F23, F31, F41, F42, G32.
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1 Introduction
How are monetary policy shocks transmitted in open economies, and how do they aect rm
dynamics? Are competitive devaluations eective in helping countries pursue export-led expan-
sions in the face of increasingly complex global supply chains? Competitive devaluations, or
currency wars, are said to occur when a country eases monetary policy specically to depreciate
its exchange rate, with the ultimate objective of making exports relatively cheap and gaining a
competitive advantage in international trade. Yet despite such measures being a prominent com-
ponent of policy discourse, the usually assumed transmission mechanism seems to be at odds
with microdata as well as the evolution of ination and net exports.1
Manipulation of the exchange rate to gain an edge over a country’s trading partners has
long been recognized as a signicant danger to the stability of the international monetary sys-
tem. Institutions and rules have been established to explicitly prevent countries from resorting to
beggar-thy-neighbor devaluation spirals. Such concerns were strong during the Asian crises in
the late 1990s as well as following the nancial crisis of 2008, once recovery was underway and
national economic interests began to diverge. Some emerging-market policymakers famously
argued that the Fed’s aggressive unconventional monetary policy initiatives were detrimental to
other economies (Bernanke (2016)). Indeed, in the new open economy macroeconomics literature,
as in the traditional Mundell–Fleming–Dornbusch model, positive monetary shocks increase do-
mestic output, employment and depreciate the real exchange rate, thereby improving the trade
balance as expenditure switches toward domestic exports.
This paper dissects the mechanisms of two recent devaluation episodes and develops a theo-
retical framework to analyze the eects of monetary policy on rm dynamics in open economies.
Identication relies primarily on a dierence-in-dierences approach, comparing rms that op-
erate in the same general equilibrium environment but are distinct in terms of their exposure
to exchange rate uctuations over time. The investigation starts with post-2012 Japan as a lab-
oratory to study competitive devaluations. That Japanese episode stands out with regard to its
magnitude and nature: the yen weakened by a staggering 50% within two years after gradually
reaching postwar highs against the U.S. dollar, a development which, according to consensus, had
been driven by purely monetary factors.2
1In the aftermath of Brexit, the devalued pound led to an increase of the trade decit as exports dropped. See, for
example, Wall Street Journal article “Currency declines lose export punch” on June 12 of 2017.
2More precisely, to raise ination, stimulate growth, and weaken the currency following years of relatively timid
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And while the Bank of Japan (BoJ) more than doubled its balance sheet from 2013 to 2015,
prevailing views contend that none of the other arrows were successful. Japan’s public debt looks
as bad as ever despite an increase in the consumption tax in 2014, and almost nothing has been
done in such areas as labor-market reform (Krugman (2016)). Those background details lay the
foundation of a two-tiered identication strategy: rst and most importantly, companies dier at
the micro level in terms of their exposure to exchange rate uctuations; secondly, at the macro
level, Abenomics represented a new monetary response to persistent economic issues, making the
episode an innately suited natural experiment to isolate the eects of competitive devaluations
not just on rms dynamics but also on aggregate outcomes.3
In contrast to Japan, the nominal devaluation of the Russian ruble in late 2014 was the re-
sult of an exogenous collapse in oil prices, which led to an abrupt nominal devaluation of 70%.
Even though this occurred without monetary interventions and against the backdrop of a wors-
ening macroeconomic environment, with travel bans and asset freezes being imposed on Russian
individuals and groups seen as pivotal in the separation of Crimea from Ukraine, the unique com-
bination of rm-level customs data with a cross-sectional identication strategy that dierences
out aggregate shocks to the economy provides external validity and conrms the same micro-
transmission channel as for Japan.4
Contrary to the predictions of standard open economy macro models, I nd that more produc-
tive exporters shrank relative to nonexporting rms in terms of domestic revenue, employment
and protability following both depreciation episodes. At the aggregate level, Japanese output
and consumption reacted sluggishly to the monetary stimulus and subsequent depreciation while
the trade balance remained unaected. The feeble response of exporters has additional implica-
tions for total output and welfare since it entails a reallocation of resources toward smaller, less
productive nonexporting rms. Furthermore, all of the main results hold within and not just
across industries, and the patterns are strongest in sectors that are more reliant on imported
intermediate inputs. Taken together, these ndings point to an underappreciated mechanism of
competitive devaluations: consistent with extant work on exchange rate pass-through into prices
(Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014)), exporters are also the largest importers and their expan-
sion may be hampered by osetting exchange rate movements on the marginal cost side. Direct
monetary interventions, the Abe government proposed three policies of what has come to be known as Abenomics:
monetary stimulus, scal exibility, and structural reform.
3See Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) for a recent discussion of identication in macroeconomics.
4The Russian customs data allow one to compute import intensities at the rm level. The focus is entirely on
non-nancial and non-resource sectors as the latter were also directly aected by falling oil prices.
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cross-sectional tests of the mechanism with unique Russian rm-level customs data yield the
exact same ndings.
Motivated by these empirical results, this paper develops a two-country New Keynesian gen-
eral equilibrium model of a monopolistically competitive industry that incorporates accepted
ingredients from international trade to understand the channels behind the main reallocation
patterns and analyze the eects of monetary policy in open economies. To the best of my knowl-
edge, the framework in this paper is the rst to combine heterogeneity among rms (in the spirit
of Melitz (2003)), imported intermediate inputs (as in Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2015)), and in-
ternational dollar pricing (Gopinath, Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010) and Gopinath (2016)) to analyze
the eects of competitive devaluations on rm dynamics.5 More productive companies end up
sourcing a larger amount of their inputs from abroad, which is a consequence of the intermediate
input aggregator in the production function displaying a “love of variety” feature, with inputs
being imperfectly substitutable as in Ethier (1982). The framework is then used to analyze the
implications of an imported input cost shock on the economy and serves as a nal, model-based
approach to identication of the mechanism.
The model is calibrated to match the empirical regularities for Japan using standard param-
eters. The eect of a competitive devaluation on rms’ relative protability, domestic revenue,
and employment allocations is simulated for an economy with or without rm heterogeneity,
assuming dierent price setting rules and for varying import intensities. The quantitative results
reproduce the main patterns in the microdata, with international dollar pricing and incomplete
nancial markets being necessary to replicate the economy’s aggregate response. Because ex-
porters tend to be the largest importers, they are forced to raise prices at home relative to less
productive nonexporting rms, which remain unexposed to the cost shock. Without changing
the qualitative predictions of the model, the quantitative t of these relative adjustment patterns
is improved via the addition of strategic complementarities in price setting. The model is closed
by assuming that central banks set the nominal quantity of money.
While a standard New Keynesian framework with producer currency pricing, homogeneous
rms, and no import intensities, as in the traditional Mundell–Fleming case, predicts that net
exports and ination increase by around 2% and 4%, respectively, the benchmark model matches
these aggregate moments with much greater success, suggesting a muted response of the trade
5Gopinath (2016) documents that the overwhelming share of world trade is invoiced in very few currencies,
which has implications for exchange rate pass-through. Chen, Chung, and Novy (2018) document a related set of
facts using transactions data for UK imports.
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balance and an increase in CPI of 3%. These results highlight the role of rm heterogeneity
and intermediate import intensities in mediating the monetary transmission mechanism; import
substitution along global value chains—rather than the growth of export champions—is a salient
channel of recent nominal devaluations.
This research builds on the new open economy macro literature. Obstfeld and Rogo (1995)
develop a two-country model to think about global macroeconomic dynamics in an environment
with monopolistic competition and sticky nominal prices. Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini, and Tille
(2000) develop a general equilibrium model nominal rigidities to study the impact of a devalua-
tion by one country on its trading partners and nd that neighboring economies may benet from
an improvement in their terms of trade. Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010) study optimal mon-
etary stabilization policy in interdependent open economies in a unied framework. While the
mechanisms under consideration are distinct, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) similarly nd that an
unanticipated exchange rate depreciation can be beggar-thyself rather than beggar-thy-neighbor
as gains in domestic output are oset by deteriorating terms of trade. The monetary block in the
paper is close to the modeling choices in Kehoe and Midrigan (2007), while a central ingredient
generating the results is international dollar invoicing, as presented in Gopinath, Itskhoki, and
Rigobon (2010), Gopinath (2016) and contemporaneously modeled in Casas, Díez, Gopinath, and
Gourinchas (2017). The latter paper proposes a “dominant currency paradigm” (DCP) and nds
support for it in the data. In contrast, the focus in the present work is on rm heterogeneity,
which is an important ingredient to help explain why exporters grow little after devaluations
besides DCP and imported inputs. Attention is further devoted to domestic rather than interna-
tional transmission channels using mainly cross-sectional identication strategies for inference.
Cravino (2017) uses customs data with invoicing information from Chile to study how nominal
exchange rate movements impact aggregate output and productivity. Mukhin (2017) presents a
general equilibrium multi-country framework with endogenous currency choice that is consis-
tent with the dominant role of the U.S. dollar.
This paper also speaks to the literature on currency wars and large shocks to the nominal
exchange rate. As in Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2016), countries are seen as shifting
output gaps between each other in a zero-sum game following competitive devaluations. This
means that domestic stimulus eects are absent and only the expenditure switching mechanism
remains. Similarly, Eggertsson, Mehrotra, Singh, and Summers (2016) nd that exchange rates
have powerful eects when the economy is in a global liquidity trap. Caballero and Lorenzoni
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(2014) model the need for intervention in the foreign exchange market to protect the export sector
after currency appreciations; Itskhoki and Moll (2018) study exchange rate policies in a standard
growth model with nancial frictions; Rodrik (2008) shows that undervaluation of the currency
stimulates economic growth; Bergin and Corsetti (2016) develop a two-country New Keynesian
model with one perfectly and another monopolistic competitive sector to show that monetary
policy can foster investment and entry into the dierentiated sector; Alessandria, Pratap, and
Yue (2015) explore the source and aggregate consequences of the gradual export expansion in
emerging markets following large devaluations; Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005) argue
that the primary force behind large drops in real exchange rates after large devaluations is the
slow adjustment in the price of nontradable goods. Cravino and Levchenko (2017a) look into the
distributional consequences of large devaluations and show that consumption costs rise most in
the bottom decile of the income distribution.
The paper is further related to numerous empirical works on exchange rate pass-through in
international trade. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) build a model of imperfect competition and vari-
able markups to explain the main features of uctuations in international relative prices. Auer,
Burstein, and Lein (2017) study pass-through of the sudden Swiss franc appreciation after the re-
moval of the euro peg in early 2015.6 Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) nd that high-performing
rms absorb exchange rate movements in their markups so that export volumes react less. Simi-
lar to this paper, Mendoza and Yue (2012) show that eciency losses result when imported inputs
are replaced by imperfect substitutes. Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2015) estimate a model of im-
porters in Hungarian microdata and nd large eects from imported inputs on rm productivity.
Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014) show that large exporters are simultaneously large importers,
which helps explaining low pass-through, whereas Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2016) use a sim-
ilar framework to estimate strategic complementarities in price setting across rms. Benigno and
Fornaro (2012) argue that rms in the tradable sector absorb foreign knowledge by importing
intermediate inputs, and Dekle, Jeong, and Kiyotaki (2014) build a dynamic general equilibrium
model with heterogeneous rms to reconcile the disconnect between exchange rate movements
and net exports. Looking at rm-level reactions to exchange rate shocks, Gopinath and Neiman
(2014) nd that productivity implications depend on individual rm adjustments that cannot be
summarized by the aggregate import share.
6Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) and Burstein and Gopinath (2014) survey the pricing-to-market literature, which
documents that rms use markup variation to smooth the eects of exchange rate shocks across destinations.
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A number of papers have explored the link between rm-level outcomes and exchange rate
devaluations. Grin and Stulz (2001) investigate the presence of signicant competitive eects
of exchange rate shocks on rms’ stock prices.7 Aguiar (2005) shows that rms with lots of short-
term foreign currency debt undertake relatively low levels of post-devaluation investment. In a
recent contribution, Alfaro, Cuñat, Fadinger, and Liu (2018) document that rm-level TFP reacts
heterogeneously to real exchange rate movements across developing and developed countries.
Using the same rm-level accounting data as in the present paper, Cravino and Levchenko (2017b)
demonstrate how multinational rms contribute to the transmission of shocks across countries.
Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008) nd that U.S. multinational companies increase revenues, assets,
and investment signicantly more than local rms following depreciations. Hofmann, Shim,
and Shin (2016) explore sovereign yields and the risk-taking channel of currency appreciation;
Avdjiev, Bruno, Koch, and Shin (2018) explore the relationship between the strength of the U.S.
dollar, cross-border bank ows and real investment.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the main institutional background
details for Japan and Russia. Section 3 describes the data sources, presents the identication
strategy, and walks through the empirical results. Section 4 develops a framework of competi-
tive devaluations featuring accepted ingredients from international trade that have not yet been
combined for thinking about monetary policy. Section 5 numerically evaluates the impact of
competitive devaluations on rm dynamics and aggregate outcomes. Section 6 concludes.
2 Devaluation Episodes
This section describes the main events leading up to the Japanese and Russian exchange rate
shocks, highlighting important commonalities and dierences. Abenomics constitutes a particu-
larly clean example of a recent competitive devaluation and is, therefore, an ideal laboratory for
studying the dynamic adjustment paths following such policies. Russia’s 2014 ruble devaluation
provides external validity to the mechanism despite having been driven by a negative shock to
export prices rather than monetary interventions.
7In related work, Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016) show that the conditional volatility of returns increases rel-
atively more for companies with stickier prices in the aftermath of monetary shocks.
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2.1 Japan: Abenomics
Having fought deation for more than two decades, Japan remains plagued by weak growth
and feeble consumer sentiment despite countless attempts to revitalize the economy. Short-term
nominal interest rates have hovered around zero since the mid 1990s, meaning that conventional
monetary policy has long exhausted its potential, and, in spite of a mild economic recovery in
the 2000s along with various scal stimulus programs, aggregate consumption and investment
remain subdued. It is against that backdrop of perpetual malaise that shortly after taking oce in
December 2012, Japan’s new prime minister, Shinzo Abe, announced a novel array of unorthodox
policies aimed at breaking through Japan’s deationary spiral.
Abe’s approach, soon labeled Abenomics, consisted of three pillars and was meant to combine
aggressive monetary easing with scal policy and structural reforms. Its immediate goal was to
boost domestic growth while raising ination to a newly set target of 2 percent. Abe’s less-well-
implemented structural policies were meant to improve economic performance by increasing
competition, overhauling corporate governance, and making labor markets more exible.
The rst, and central, pillar of Abenomics was an unprecedented policy of monetary easing.
Soon after Abe’s election, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) was given a mandate to generate two percent
ination as measured by the consumer price index (CPI), while the introduction quantitative
easing (QE) meant that the monetary base would increase at an annual pace of about 60-70 trillion
yen.8 The BoJ began buying Japanese government bonds (JGBs), increasing their outstanding
amount at an annual pace of about 50 trillion yen, and JGBs of all maturities, including 40-year
bonds, were made eligible for purchase. With the objective of lowering risk premia, the BoJ also
started purchasing ETFs and real estate investment trusts (J-REITs) on a much smaller scale, with
annual paces of 1 trillion yen and 30 billion yen, respectively.
Yet the economy continued to recover moderately and ination remained subdued following
a consumption-tax hike and a substantial decline in crude oil prices. The BoJ voted for an accel-
eration of its JGB purchases on October 31, 2014. The amount outstanding of JGBs would now
increase at an annual pace of about 80 trillion yen (an addition of about 30 trillion yen compared
with the rst round). The average remaining maturity of the BoJ’s JGB purchases was also ex-
tended to about 7-10 years. Overall, and compared with past eorts to revive the economy, this
monetary component of Abenomics achieved a great deal by beating core deation (excluding
8As a result, high-powered money reached approximately 200 trillion yen at the end of 2013 and 270 trillion yen
at the end of 2014, starting from 138 trillion yen outstanding at the end of 2012.
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energy prices) and, importantly, devaluing the yen by 50% in just under two years.
In the meantime, structural reforms and scal policies have advanced haltingly. An increase
in the consumption tax from 5% to 8% in April 2014 caused damage to household spending and
GDP growth despite an initial scal stimulus bill of 10.3 trillion yen targeting disaster prevention,
spending on infrastructure, and reconstruction. A second value-added tax rise to 10% has been
announced and twice postponed. Essentially, with a public debt level of 250%, Japan’s ability to
use expansionary scal policy is limited by the important challenge of scal consolidation. Con-
sistent with the identifying assumptions in this paper, Japanese growth has been disappointing
in part due to the missing second and third arrows.9
Abe’s eorts at structural reforms failed to deliver breakthroughs. The few adopted policies
introduced new corporate governance codes for Japanese institutional investors. In 2012, only
two-fths of leading companies had independent directors, whereas nearly all of them do now.
However, those changes were introduced after the yen depreciation and the main cross-sectional
patterns discussed in section 3.3 began to emerge. Besides, any governance reforms should have
penalized nonexporting rms and depressed their equity prices relative to the larger and less
opaque multinationals—indicating that the main estimates are likely to be lower bounds on the
eects of the devaluation.10
2.2 Russia: 2014 Devaluation
In 2014, a decline in investor condence led to a rapid fall in the value of the Russian ruble.
Falling condence in the Russian economy stemmed from two major sources: rst, the price of
crude oil, a key Russian export, declined by nearly 50% from June 2014 to December 2014; second,
the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 precipitated Western asset freezes on Russian energy
and banking sectors that were implemented by July 2014.11 In response, Russia implemented a
wide-ranging food import ban against the EU, although no other trade was restricted.
The partial cuto from western sources of nancing is unlikely to have exerted a dieren-
tial inuence on importing versus nonimporting rms in Russia. Besides, it can hardly explain
the observed domestic revenue and employment reallocation in favor of smaller, more nan-
9In fact, the IMF estimates that overall scal policy has actually gotten tighter due to the described consumption-
tax increase (Krugman (2016)).
10Overall, structural reforms remain largely unimplemented, and unconventional monetary policy has unani-
mously been seen as the only potent arrow of Abenomics (Hausman and Wieland (2015)).
11See, for example, the New York Times article “Raising Stakes on Russia, U.S. Adds Sanctions” on July 17 of 2014.
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cially constrained nonimporters after the devaluation. Further, the cross-sectional transmission
patterns are robust to the exclusion of not just nancial rms, some of which underwent di-
rect scrutiny, but also the entire oil and gas extraction sector. Excluding those resource sectors
from the analysis is important because of the direct negative shock to their revenue streams in
the aftermath of the oil price collapse, which would confound the impact of the ruble devalua-
tion. Removing oil and gas rms also helps identify the intermediate inputs channel as the bulk
of all pre-devaluation dollar borrowing occurred in precisely those sectors.12 Finally, given the
large size of the baseline sample for Russia and a regression model that accounts for a dieren-
tial response to the devaluation by rms with varying debt levels, the result are unlikely to be
contaminated by negative balance sheet eects stemming from currency mismatch.
In general, and in spite of the contrasting macroeconomic environment, the availability of
Russian rm-level customs data with import intensities for each company, a cross-sectional iden-
tication strategy that strips out aggregate shocks, as well as a focus on non-nancial and non-
resource oriented industries provides for meaningful external validity and conrms the signi-
cance of the imported intermediate inputs channel through direct examination.
2.3 Aggregate patterns
Panel (A) of Figure 1 displays Japan’s nominal exchange rate and trade balance over time. As the
yen devalued rapidly against most currencies at the end of 2012, both exports and imports (mea-
sured in U.S. dollars) declined modestly for around two years, until the second wave of QE further
depreciated the yen and appeared to put a dent into the growth of imports. Exports, however,
still failed to increase—the initial deterioration of the trade balance, which started to improve
only around 2015 is not simply the J-curve eect: while a low substitutability between domestic
and imported inputs ensured that Japanese rms were reluctant to decrease their imports for a
long time, standard open economy reasoning would dictate that the trade balance should even-
tually improve due to rising exports.13 Moreover, Japan’s aggregate patterns are at odds with the
well-known local currency pricing (LCP) paradigm as one would not expect imports (valued in
dollars) to remain insensitive to a devaluation of such magnitude under that particular form of
12According to Thomson Reuters SDC data, from 2006 until 2014 Russian companies operating in non-natural
resource and non-nancial industries issued only 66 foreign-denominated bonds.
13Apart from Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014), multiple other studies suggest that rm-level import intensities
are time-invariant. Boehm, Flaaen, and Pandalai-Nayar (2017) argue that the elasticity of substitution between im-
ported and domestic inputs is extremely low and nearly that implied by a Leontief production function; Barrot and
Sauvagnat (2016) estimate the elasticity of substitution across intermediate inputs to be around zero.
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price rigidity. Panel (B) of Figure 1 shows the same graphs for Russia. Since the ruble devaluation
was even more abrupt, it led to a much more rapid decline in both dollar exports and imports, as
would be symptomatic of a crisis episode.
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Figure 1: Exchange rates and trade balances
Note: Panel (A) shows the evolution in logarithms of the following time series for Japan (normalized
to zero in January 2012): the USDJPY exchange rate, imports in USD, and exports in USD. Panel (B)
plots analogous time series for Russia from January 2013 until 2015.
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Figure 2: Price indexes
Note: Panel (A) shows the evolution in logarithms of the following time series for Japan (normalized
to zero in January 2012): the USDJPY exchange rate, CPI, and the import price index. Panel (B) plots
analogous time series for Russia from January 2013 until 2015.
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Figure 2 documents the evolution of the consumer price indexes (CPI) and the import price
indexes, plotted against the nominal exchange rates of both countries. The increase of the im-
port price indexes is conspicuous, as should be expected under international dollar pricing. The
consumer price index (CPI) barely moves following the monetary expansion in Japan, rising by
only 3% two years after the devaluation started.14 This comes despite a 50% nominal devaluation
but is only partially surprising given that Japan is a fairly closed economy—exports and imports
each represent about 14% of GDP—and another important source of much of the observed price
rigidity is nominal wage stickiness.15
3 Data and Empirical Results
This section describes the microdata, the methodology used for identication, and presents key
empirical results on the expansion paths of nonexporting/nonimporting and multinational rms
following both devaluation episodes.
3.1 Data construction
The operating information on Japanese rms and their international revenues is sourced from
the Worldscope, Capital IQ, and ORBIS data sets. The former two sources mostly cover big listed
companies, and they are combined for cross-checking reasons and to limit the number of missing
observations. The ORBIS database, compiled by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvD),
provides rm-level microdata for many countries around the world and contains nancial ac-
counting information from detailed, harmonized balance sheets and income statements of private
companies. The main sample contains annual rm-level data on public Worldscope and Capital
IQ as well as private ORBIS rms over the period from 2010 to 2015.
The Russian rm-level operating data are sourced from Amadeus, a more comprehensive sub-
set of ORBIS that specializes in collecting nancial information on millions of publicly traded and
private companies in Western and Eastern Europe. As with ORBIS, the data usually come from
local information providers and company registers. The customs data are obtained from the Fed-
14The increase in the sales tax from 5% to 8% in April 2014 contributed partially to CPI ination, generating a
further rise of about 1.2 percentage points in May of 2014.
15According to Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, nominal wages were perfectly sticky over this time
period while the real wage index declined by exactly the same amount as overall ination increased. Those patterns
imply that both sticky wages and international dollar pricing are key features of the macroeconomic environment—
an observation that informs modeling choices in section 4.
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eral Customs Service of Russia and include information on the universe of Russian importers and
exporters from January 2013 until April 2014, just before the abrupt ruble devaluation in late 2014.
The data are reported at daily frequencies and include rms’ unique tax identication number
(INN), a nine digit HS product code, the invoice currency for each transaction, the gross and net
weights, the ruble and U.S. dollar values of each shipment, the country of origin and destination,
as well as other pertinent details. Those customs data are then linked to each Amadeus rm
using the INN, and rms that have missing identiers are hand-matched by zip code, industry
and name. The resulting merged data les allow for the calculation of import intensities of each
Russian rm in the Amadeus data.
All main specications restrict attention to a balanced sample, and rm-years for which infor-
mation on revenue, employment, and total assets is not available are excluded from the analysis.
Observations with negative equity, revenue, or revenue growth larger than 200% are similarly
omitted. Industries are classied at the four-digit SIC level and all nancial rms (6000–6800 SIC
range) are dropped. In the merged Japanese public and private rm data, this selection procedure
leaves 593 four-digit industries and 30,916 companies operating mainly in manufacturing sec-
tors. The average number of rms per industry is about 52, and the number of companies with
multinational operations and exports constitutes 14% of the total number of rms in an industry.
Analogous preprocessing for Russia generates a baseline sample with 263 four-digit NAICS indus-
tries and 69,036 rms operating in non-nancial and non-resource industries. The mean number
of rms per sector is 262 and importers amount to 12% of this total. Appendix A provides deni-
tions of the variables used in the empirical section and describes well-known techniques to avoid
missing-data problems when downloading the ORBIS data.
The main empirical results for Japan are based on the pooled public and private rm data
set.16 However, the main results are unchanged when the analysis is conned to the subsample
of listed rms. Many investors and market participants have further noted the relatively strong
performance of small-caps in Japan, even when judged against some of the biggest exporters
since the onset of Abenomics.17 And given that the largest exporters are usually also the biggest
importers (Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014)), this preliminary evidence lends support to the
16Japan has one of the highest percentages of publicly listed rms compared with other industrialized nations.
According to the World Bank, the market capitalization of listed domestic companies in Japan as a percentage of
GDP was about 119% in 2015, whereas the same number for Germany stood at 51.1%.
17See, for example, The Japan Times article “Japan’s small-caps doing well while big exporters get a bruising” on
January 15 of 2016.
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intermediate inputs channel stressed in the paper.18
Panel (A) of Table 1 provides summary statistics on a range of key rm-specic characteristics
for Japan in 2012, one year prior to the onset of Abenomics. The exporter indicator represents
the treatment variable for Japanese rms, and it is equal to 0 whenever a rm has no foreign sales
and 1 if the company is a continuing exporter between 2010 and 2015. As in other countries, the
incidence of exporting is rare for both Japan and Russia, and, whenever rms export, they still
cater primarily to the domestic market.19 Panel (B) of Table 1 lists analogous summary statistics
for Russian non-nancial companies. Again, importing is extremely rare on average, and, as can
be seen from Table 2, even though 91.71% of rms do not import any intermediate inputs, the
largest 2.17% of importers account for 73.13% of the overall import value. Furthermore, exporters
capture 22% of the domestic revenue volume in Japan in 2012, whereas importers account for 46%
of total domestic sales in Russia in 2013.
The aggregate data on output, ination, trade balances, and interest rate statistics are collected
from the Japanese Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, and the Russian Federal State Statistics
Service. Spot and forward exchange rate information is sourced from IHS Global Insight, and
the Japanese import content of production is measured at the industry level, based on the 2011
OECD input-output tables. The observed variation in import intensities across sectors is exploited
to reveal the precise mechanisms underlying the cross-sectional rm-level results.
3.2 Identication
This section lays out the identication strategy for estimating the adjustment paths of relatively
exposed and unexposed rms to both devaluation episodes. Methods for gauging the importance
of dierent mechanisms are discussed.
At the macro level, the identication challenge stems from the endogeneity of nominal ex-
change rate movements. Many countries have experienced periods of large real exchange rate
devaluations, and in general many factors have the potential to fuel such currency uctuations.
18For Japan, the analysis relies on a company’s segment les to identify exporters. While foreign sales combine
exports together with total revenues generated in other countries, extant trade research points to most international
commerce as being carried out by multinationals that both export and use their foreign aliates to serve the host
market (e.g., Antràs and Yeaple (2014), Tintelnot (2017), Rob and Vettas (2003)). The Russian rm-level customs data
allow one to dissect the mechanism directly and conrm the baseline results for Japan.
19Previous work has documented that exporting rms ship a relatively small fraction of their total produce abroad.
For example, computer and electronic industries have the highest fraction of exports to total shipments in the U.S.,
and yet that number is only 21% (Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007)).
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean SD p25 p50 p75 No. obs.
(A): Japanese rm-level variables
Exporter indicator 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 30,916
Import content of production 11.36 4.61 9.30 11.30 11.30 30,916
Employment 138 1753 7.00 15 37 30,916
Log domestic revenue 9.13 3.33 7.53 8.67 9.76 30,916
Log gross prot 7.48 3.34 5.92 6.93 8.03 30,916
Return-to-assets 0.77 34.44 0.06 1.07 3.56 30,915
Log cost of goods sold 8.84 3.37 7.23 8.42 9.54 30,751
Firm age (as of 2012) 34.21 17.25 21.00 33.00 46.00 30,851
Firm size (log assets) 8.73 3.47 7.02 8.29 9.51 30,916
Leverage (debt-to-equity) 32.90 58.44 4.66 23.35 45.79 30,916
Cash-to-assets 0.26 0.19 0.11 0.21 0.36 30,916
Log market capitalization 23.25 1.63 22.02 23.09 24.26 1,113
Tobin’s Q ratio 2.02 2.19 1.61 1.87 2.19 1,113
(B): Russian rm-level variables
Import intensity, ϕi 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 69,073
Employment 131 3484 29 44 85 67,577
Log domestic revenue 17.25 2.12 15.77 17.14 18.61 67,080
Log gross prot 15.53 2.40 13.97 15.52 17.13 48,484
Return-to-assets 8.62 19.80 0.41 5.23 15.12 66,213
Log cost of goods sold 17.31 2.21 15.78 17.24 18.78 52,683
Firm age (as of 2013) 14.52 8.13 9.00 13.00 19.00 69,073
Firm size (log assets) 16.80 2.30 15.13 16.69 18.33 67,572
Leverage (debt-to-equity) 54.91 136.03 0.00 0.11 36.92 59,634
Cash-to-assets 0.10 0.17 0.01 0.03 0.11 64,762
Note: This table presents summary statistics for the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Panel (A) reports summary statistics for private rms in the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) ORBIS database
as of 2012, together with public rms from Thomson ReutersWorldscope. Panel (B) contains summary
statistics for Russian Amadeus rms in 2013.
For example, those factors can stem from domestic policies aimed at combating deationary risks,
to large capital outows caused by domestic or external factors, to exchange rate interventions
at home or abroad, to domestic consumption booms, or to a sharp fall in the terms of trade in
commodity producing economies.
The Japanese exchange rate devaluation from late 2012 until 2014 was a new policy response
to persistent issues—Abenomics entailed an unprecedented monetary expansion that resulted
in a yen depreciation of roughly 50% against the U.S. dollar within two years. Attributing any
aggregate reaction to a competitive devaluation would be complicated if, for example, adverse
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Table 2: Distribution of import intensity among importers
No. of rms Fraction of rms Fraction of import value
ϕi = 0 63,539 91.71% 0%
0 < ϕi ≤ 0.1 2,976 4.30% 7.62%
0.1 < ϕi ≤ 0.2 635 0.92% 6.67%
0.2 < ϕi ≤ 0.3 370 0.53% 5.34%
0.3 < ϕi ≤ 0.4 256 0.37% 7.24%
ϕi > 0.4 1,506 2.17% 73.13%
Note: This table shows the distribution of import intensity among Russian non-nancial companies
for 2013. Import intensity, ϕi, is dened for each rm as the share of imported intermediate inputs
from outside of Russia in total variable costs.
productivity shocks were the true underlying force instead.
At the micro level, accounting information and novel rm-level customs data from Russia are
used to investigate the response of rms that vary in their exposure to exchange rate uctuations
while stripping out aggregate shocks to the economy.
3.2.1 Cross-sectional evidence
Much of the evidence relies on nominal exchange rates aecting nonexporting/nonimporting
companies dierentially compared to multinationals in Japan and Russia. Because the objective
is to discipline the transmission mechanism of devaluations using rm-level data, the main focus
will be on investigating the causal impact of the devaluations on domestic revenue, employment,
and protability via a dierence-in-dierences estimation strategy.
Another important concern has to do with the timing of the eects. In particular, any dispari-
ties between the more aected exporters/importers and the relatively unaected, purely domestic
rms might be driven by pre-existing trends that originated before the onset of Abenomics or the
ruble devaluation. To lend additional support to the causal interpretation of the results, the next
series of tests relies on using repeated observations for the same company over time. The follow-
ing xed-eects regression allows one to see whether causes happen before consequences and
not vice versa:
log(Yi,t) = αi + θ
′Xi,t +
∑
t
γtDt +
∑
t
δt (Dt ·Xi,t) +
∑
t
ψt (Dt · Treati) + i,t (1)
∀i, ∀t ∈ {2010, . . . , 2015} \ {2012}
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where Yit are either domestic revenue, employment, or protability (return on assets or market
capitalization) of company i in year t, αi are rm xed eects, Treati is an indicator variable
equal to 1 whenever a rm is a Japanese exporter and 0 when the rm is entirely domestic,Dt is
an indicator for the time period (year), with 2012 taken as the omitted category for Japan, (Dt ·
Treati) represents an interaction term between the year dummies and the treatment indicator
dened by the disparity between solely domestic versus exporting rms, and Xi,t is a matrix of
control variables that includes size (log of assets), leverage, as well as cash-to-assets—covariates
that are widely used in the literature. All standard errors are clustered at the rm-level to allow for
serial correlation across time. When implementing this framework on the merged Russian rm-
level customs data to test the imported intermediate inputs channel directly, Treati becomes a
rm’s import intensity rather than an exporter dummy.20
As required with any dierence-in-dierences estimation approach, this specication also
provides evidence on the parallel trends assumption in all outcome variables. That is, in the
absence of treatment, the unobserved disparities between exposed and less exposed companies
should be constant over time; the validity of the estimation procedure relies on outcome vari-
ables that would have continued to develop as they did before either devaluation episode. Unless
this assumption is valid, the estimated treatment eects would be biased versions of the true
impact. As an additional robustness check on the identication strategy, all control variables
are interacted with the Dt time indicators to allow for possible heterogeneous reactions to the
devaluations across dierent types of rms over time. For example, a prominent alternative hy-
pothesis involves simultaneous interest rate changes that occurred as a consequence of QE, yet
even if movements in interest rates had nonuniform repercussions for exporting and nonexport-
ing rms, the interaction of all control variables, especially leverage, with the full set of year
dummies would soak up the bulk of that variation.
The main parameters of interest are the ψt coecients as they capture the dierence between
more strongly aected exporters/importers and less aected nonexporting/nonimporting rms
over time. For Japan, the estimated xed-eects model includes leads going back to 2010 and
lags reaching 2015. The available data for Russia allows one to include three leads starting from
2011 and one post-devaluation lag in 2015. The specication tolerates any causal direction of the
ndings and assesses whether the eects grow or fade over time.
20This treatment intensity is dened as the share of imported intermediate inputs in total variable costs of a rm
in 2013 (right-winsorized at the 99.5 percentile). 2014 becomes the omitted year category.
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Appendix B lays out a triple dierence methodology to tease out the transmission mechanism
in Japan as rm-level customs data is unavailable to facilitate a direct test as for Russia.
3.3 Empirical results
This section presents the main cross-sectional ndings in Japan and Russia following both deval-
uation episodes. Heterogeneous import intensities are shown to be the key driving force behind
the unorthodox adjustment patterns across rms.
3.3.1 Cross-sectional evidence
Before turning to the baseline results, the data reveal some pertinent information about entry
into exporting (or foreign sales). As conrmed in previous trade studies (e.g., Bilbiie, Ghironi, and
Melitz (2012)), this extensive margin is inconsequential in terms of the overall trade volume. The
distinction between new exporters and nonexporting rms is thus also left out from subsequent
analysis—attention is devoted to purely domestic rms and continuing exporters when evaluating
the cross-sectional impact of both devaluation episodes.21
As revealed by the summary statistics, companies that engage in export activity are distinct
along a number of relevant dimensions. Table 3 tests whether multinationals are in fact system-
atically dierent from their counterparts based on more formal regression analysis. Panel (A) of
Table 3 presents estimated model coecients of the export status of Japanese rms on various
rm-level characteristics in 2012. Panel (B) does the same for Russian companies with import
intensity, ϕi, as the dependent variable in 2013.
Indeed, exporters (and importers) are much larger than purely domestic rms in terms of
their balance sheet size (log assets) as well as employment or domestic revenue; they tend to
be dierentially levered in both countries; they are distinct as far as their cash-to-assets ratio is
concerned, and they are characterized by a higher price-to-book ratio for public rms, meaning
that they are growth stocks in larger proportions than nonexporting/nonimporting companies.
Those dierences suggest that all regressions should control for key time-varying disparities
21Even though Japan experienced a feeble aggregate reaction of export volumes (as shown in Figure 1), the weaker
yen appears to have induced entry into foreign sales. Unreported results show that there was a steep increase in
the proportion of companies with positive foreign sales after the devaluation. However, the evidence also indicates
that, despite growing at a faster rate than existing multinationals, the cohort of 2013 entrants (rms that have never
listed any foreign sales prior to 2013) represents a negligible fraction of the total foreign sales volume. Indeed,
newcomers turn out to resemble purely domestic rms more closely than continuing exporters in terms of size and
other pertinent operating characteristics.
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Table 3: Correlates of import intensity and export status
Coecient S.E. R2 No. obs.
(A): Japanese rm-level variables, xi
Log employment 0.014*** 0.004 0.064 30,916
Log domestic revenue 0.008*** 0.002 0.125 30,916
Log gross prot 0.008*** 0.002 0.127 30,915
Return on assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 33,379
Size (log assets) 0.008*** 0.002 0.128 30,916
Leverage -0.000** 0.000 0.000 30,916
Cash-to-assets -0.008** 0.004 0.000 30,916
Log market capitalization 0.044*** 0.015 0.038 1,113
Tobin’s Q ratio 0.018*** 0.006 0.012 1,113
(B): Russian rm-level variables, xi
Log employment 0.016*** 0.003 0.018 67,546
Log domestic revenue 0.010*** 0.002 0.034 67,052
Log gross prot 0.011*** 0.002 0.040 48,462
Return on assets 0.000* 0.000 0.001 66,183
Size (log assets) 0.009*** 0.002 0.031 67,541
Leverage 0.000*** 0.000 0.002 59,608
Cash-to-assets -0.004 0.008 0.000 64,732
Note: Panel (A) presents regressions of the export status of Japanese rms as the dependent variable
on various rm-level characteristics. Panel (B) does the same for the import intensity, ϕi, of Russian
rms in 2013: ϕi = α + βxi + ui. The table shows that importing (or exporting) rms tend to be a
lot bigger in terms of assets, revenue and employment. Those companies also tend to have dierent
leverage or cash-to-assets ratios when compared with their nonimporting (or nonexporting) peers.
Standard errors are clustered at the two digit SIC level. ***,**,* indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
among companies, such as size and other balance sheet items that have been widely used in
the nance literature and are pertinent to revenue and employment choices. Importantly, the
inclusion of those control variables based on correlations in Table 3 has almost no bearing on the
responsiveness of all main outcomes to the devaluation episodes. At the same time, it is important
to account for major dissimilarities between exporting and nonexporting rms to elicit unbiased
treatment eects of both nominal devaluations.
The results in Figure 3 restrict attention to Japanese rms and plot the estimated ψt coe-
cients of equation 1 for employment, domestic revenue, and market capitalization as outcome
variables with 95% condence intervals around them.22 As would be consistent with the parallel
22Market capitalization is taken to be the baseline protability measure for Japan as there is no consistent return
on assets variable in the combined public and private rm database due to deviations in accounting conventions
used by ORBIS and Worldscope. Nonetheless, the results are qualitatively very similar for the gross prot margin as
20
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Figure 3: Coecient plots for Japanese rms
Note: These gures plot the estimated ψt coecients from equation 1 for employment, domestic rev-
enue andmarket capitalization as outcome variables with 95% condence intervals. Time ismeasured
in years and the vertical red (dashed) lines mark the beginning of Abenomics.
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trends assumption, the estimates in Figure 3 show no robust dierences between exporters and
nonexporting rms in the years prior to the onset of quantitative easing: the estimated treatment
eects—capturing dierences between both types of companies over time—are indistinguishable
from zero before the intervention, whereas they become negative and highly signicant in the
years following Abenomics. The results indicate that exporters’ domestic revenues shrink by ap-
proximately 7%, employment gradually decreases by about 5%, and market capitalization falls by
about 10% relative to purely domestic nonexporting rms.23
Overall, and in sharp contrast to conventional open economy macro wisdom, exporters gain
less from the nominal devaluation than exclusively domestic small caps and private rms. The
results are also robust to the inclusion of industry-year xed eects, which further suggests that
the adjustment patterns are driven by rm heterogeneity within rather than across industries—
an observation that is built into the theoretical framework in section 4. A question arises as to
why Abenomics had this puzzling dierential impact on the dynamics of continuing exporters
versus purely domestic companies. After all, baseline models would predict that the former group
should gain competitiveness in export markets as a result of the yen devaluation. One possible
explanation is the countervailing inuence of rising marginal costs due to increasingly more
expensive and poorly substitutable imported intermediate inputs. In fact, the ndings thus far
are consistent with the marginal cost channel outweighing any positive eects in export markets
and showing no signs of attenuating later on.24
3.3.2 Mechanisms
Despite the starkly dierent macroeconomic conditions in Russia around 2014, the availability of
rm-level customs data with import intensities for each company implies that the above cross-
sectional identication strategy can be applied to test the mechanism directly while stripping
out aggregate shocks that aect all types of rms in the same way. As discussed in section 3.1,
identication is further bolstered through the exclusive focus on non-nancial and non-resource
oriented industries to provide external validity.
the outcome variable.
23In unreported gures, all of these outcome variables are shown to expand in levels and not just in relative
terms between exporters and nonexporters. The steep reaction of stock prices to the yen devaluation is particularly
surprising given the low overall levels of ination observed during this period and the fact that exchange rates are
often seen as “disconnected” from other variables.
24Other narratives, such as a foreign demand shock, the presence of foreign subsidiaries, or hedging exposure
could inuence rm prots but cannot explain the joint reallocation patterns for domestic revenue and employment.
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Figure 4: Coecient plots for Russian rms
Note: These gures plot the estimated ψt coecients from equation 1 for employment, domestic
revenue and return on assets as outcome variables with 95% condence intervals. Time is measured
in years and the vertical red (dashed) lines mark the 2014 ruble devaluation episode.
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The results in Figure 4 plot the estimated ψt coecients of equation 1 using the Russian data
for employment, domestic revenue, and return on assets as outcome variables with 95% con-
dence intervals around them. As in the case of Japan, the estimates in Figure 4 show no robust
dierences between importers and nonimporters in the years prior to the 2014 ruble devaluation
and are, therefore, entirely consistent with the parallel trends assumption. The results indicate
that importers’ domestic revenues shrink by approximately 7%, employment decreases by about
2%, and the return on assets falls by about 12% relative to smaller nonimporting rms one year af-
ter the abrupt devaluation. These ndings lend additional support to the signicance of imported
intermediate inputs in the transmission channel.25
The analysis in this section has relied on the identifying assumption that exchange rate move-
ments rather than any other factor exerted the primary dierential inuence on rms and led to
the trends observed following both devaluation episodes. Another prominent hypothesis em-
phasizes interest rate shifts. Yet the evidence is limited as far as downward pressure on the yield
curve is concerned—Japanese long-term interest rates were already very low when Abenomics
came into force, and they actually increased following the announcement of U.S. tapering in early
2013. This can be seen from Panel (B) in Figure B.1, which shows the 8-year yield on JGBs, a se-
curity class that was heavily targeted during Japan’s QE interventions. Long-term interest rates
only declined somewhat further toward 2015, after the second round of quantitative easing. By
that time, all of the main cross-sectional eects had already set in: domestic revenues, employ-
ment, and stock prices were rising for nonexporting rms relative to exporters. Besides, it would
be hard to envisage a theory for why lower interest rates would generate the observed patterns
between exporters and nonexporters. Interest rate movements could therefore not have been the
main explanatory factor behind the empirical regularities.
Lastly, potential confounding factors stemming from a revaluation of long-term debt are ac-
counted for in the regression model—the inclusion of leverage as well as its interaction term with
the time indicator allows for a heterogeneous response to the nominal devaluation across rms
with varying degrees of exposure to long-term debt in both Russia and Japan.26 Taken together,
25Appendix B sheds more light on the role of intermediate inputs as the driving force behind the results in Japan.
A triple dierence methodology is used and conrms the same transmission channel as for Russia.
26Another alternative story could stress currency mismatch and dierential exposure to dollar borrowing across
rms. This phenomenon is extremely rare in Japan, where only a tiny fraction of companies have ever issued a
Eurobond. In Russia, only 66 foreign currency bonds were issued by non-nancial and non-resource oriented com-
panies in 2006–2014. See Bruno and Shin (2017) or, recently, Salomao and Varela (2018) for more detail on the foreign
currency borrowing channel.
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these ndings inform a new theoretical paradigm that features a more realistic microstructure of
the economy to understand the eects of monetary policy and competitive devaluations on rm
dynamics. The model in section 4 embeds heterogeneous import intensities across rms as an
ingredient for generating the observed cross-sectional patterns documented so far.
4 Model
This section develops a framework to help interpret the dierential treatment eects between
exporters and nonexporters in section 3.3 and uses it to understand the mechanism underlying
the dynamic adjustment path of the economy.
There are two countries of equal size, home (H) and foreign (F). As in the models of Obstfeld
and Rogo (2000) and Obstfeld and Rogo (1996), rms produce dierentiated goods using het-
erogeneous labor inputs. Workers are subject to a Calvo friction when setting wages in home
currency, but domestic prices are exible and can be changed in response to market conditions.
Home and foreign produce an array of tradable goods.27
Several ingredients from trade are ingrained into the framework. First, rms are treated as
heterogeneous, choosing to sell products and to source intermediate inputs from abroad. The
exchange rate enters via three potential channels: i) by changing the costs of imported inputs,
ii) by potentially changing the export prices in local currency, and iii) by aecting the degree of
import competition in the domestic market. Strategic complementarities in price setting improve
the quantitative t without changing the qualitative predictions of the model.
Second, the following international pricing structure is compared in turn: i) producer cur-
rency pricing (PCP), ii) local currency pricing (LCP), and iii) dollar currency pricing (DCP). The
last is consistent with recent evidence on most trade being invoiced in U.S. dollars (Gopinath
(2016)) and is critical in reproducing observed patterns in the data. The nominal exchange rate,
, is expressed as home currency per unit of foreign currency. Going forward, the home cur-
rency can be thought of as yen and the foreign currency as dollar. Figure 5 provides a schematic
representation of the benchmark model.28
27One might think that tradable goods are products of exporters whereas nontraded goods are produced by non-
exporters. However, this would be inconsistent with the data and the model will account for the fact that all cross-
sectional patterns are observed within rather than across industries.
28Exporting rms and their non-domestic operations are depicted in blue. The foreign market is also shown in a
smaller size than the domestic market, which reects trade stylized facts about exporting rms shipping a relatively
small fraction of their total produce abroad (see, for example, Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2007)).
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Figure 5: Schematic representation of benchmark model
Motivated by Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012) and unreported empirical facts showing that
entry into foreign sales is a negligible portion of trade, the export/import status of a rm is as-
sumed to be xed.29 The trade literature (e.g., Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2015), or Amiti, It-
skhoki, and Konings (2014)) takes a detailed approach when thinking about rm import and ex-
port decisions and concludes that both are highly correlated in equilibrium as well as in the data.
This implies that the majority of rms are either exporters or nonexporters, and so the present
treatment focuses on those two types, thereby mimicking the empirical discussion.
4.1 Households
There is monopolistic competition in the labor market among households who set staggered
nominal wage contracts. Individual household labor supply is dierentiated and indexed by i on
the unit interval. Household-level labor inputs, `i,t, are aggregated to generate total labor supply,
Lt, before this is supplied to rms. Specically:
Lt =
(∫ 1
0
`
φ−1
φ
i,t di
) φ
φ−1
(2)
where φ > 1 represents the elasticity of the relative wage. Standard CES aggregation results
for the prot maximization problem generate formulas for the demand for each given variety
29New rms account for a very small share of overall production and employment, meaning that at rst approxi-
mation one can ignore the extensive margin when studying aggregate outcomes.
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of dierentiated household labor supply and an aggregate wage index, which depend on the
individual-specic wage for labor of type i, Wi,t, and the aggregate wage index Wt, at which the
composite labor bundle is leased to rms:
`i,t =
(
Wi,t
Wt
)−φ
Lt, Wt =
(∫ 1
0
W 1−φi,t di
) 1
1−φ
(3)
Utility is derived from an aggregate index of nal real goods consumption (discussed further
below) and leisure, with preferences assumed to be separable. Households retain pricing power
over their individual-specic nominal wages as they supply dierentiated labor services.
Households face a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint such that the nominal budget constraint
for a household i at time period t is given by:
Ptci,t +Bi,t +Mi,t = Wi,t`i,t + PtΓt + (1 + it−1)Bi,t−1 +Mi,t−1 (4)
wherePt is the aggregate price level, ci,t represents real consumption,Bi,t are nominal bonds,Mi,t
represents nominal money holdings,Wi,t is the nominal wage paid to household with individual-
specic labor type i, `i,t is individual-specic labor supply, Γt are real lump-sum transfers paid
to all households (which will include rm prots and government transfers), it−1 is the nominal
interest rate on bonds held between periods t−1 and t. Previous asset holdings are given as bonds,
Bi,t−1, and nominal money, Mi,t−1. The cash-in-advance constraint species that households
must nance consumption through monetary holdings (Ptci,t ≤ Mi,t−1). Both constraints may
be re-written in real terms to become:
ci,t + bi,t +mi,t = wi,t`i,t + Γt +
1 + it−1
1 + pit
bi,t−1 +
mi,t−1
1 + pit
(5)
(1 + pit)ci,t ≤ mi,t−1 (6)
where real variables are dened as lower-case equivalents, bi,t ≡ Bi,t/Pt, mi,t ≡ Mi,t/Pt, wi,t ≡
Wi,t/Pt and 1 + pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denotes the rate of ination in the economy.
Households maximize utility by choosing real consumption, dierentiated labor supply, real
wages, real bond holdings and real money balances:
max
ci,t,`i,t,wi,t,bi,t,mi,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ci,t, li,t) (7)
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where: u(ci,t, `i,t) = ln ci,t − κ
`1+ψi,t
1 + ψ
(8)
subject to the real budget constraints above, and the rst order condition which links the
individual-specic real wage and labor supply decisions. This rst order condition may be used
directly in the household problem to eliminate dependence on `i,t as a choice variable, and focus
instead on wi,t as household i’s objective in the labor market.30
Households are subject to a Calvo friction when setting wages. In any given period, they
may adjust their wage with probability 1 − θ and maintain the previous-period nominal wage
otherwise. The standard standard optimality condition for household who are able to update
their real wage is given by:
w#,1+φψt =
φ
φ− 1
Et
[∑∞
s=t(βθ)
s−tκwφ(1+ψ)s Lψ+1s Π
φ(ψ+1)
t,s
]
Et
[∑∞
s=t(βθ)
s−tλsw
φ
sΠ
φ−1
t,s Ls
] (12)
where Πt,s ≡
∏s
m=1(1+pit+s) denotes the product of a series of inationary realizations, and due
to symmetry of the problem across all households dependence on index i is removed. Intuitively,
households set their wage equal to a constant markup over a weighted average of current and
expected future marginal rates of substitution between labor and consumption.
The index of nal real goods consumption, ct, is taken as a CES aggregated index of home
and foreign tradable goods:
ct =
[
α
1
η c
η−1
η
H,t + (1− α)
1
η c
η−1
η
F,t
] η
1−η
(13)
where the basket of goods comprises of consumption by the home country of an index of home
goods, cH,t, and consumption by the home country of an index of foreign goods, cF,t. The degree
30The three rst order conditions for an optimal solution of the associated Lagrangian with respect to consump-
tion, real bond holdings and real money balances are then as follows:
1
ci,t
= λi,t + µi,t(1 + pit) (9)
λi,t = βEt
[
λi,t+1
1 + it
1 + pit+1
]
(10)
λi,t = βEt
[
λi,t+1
1 + pii,t+1
+ µi,t+1
]
(11)
where λi,t denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint and µi,t denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the
cash-in-advance constraint.
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of home bias is represented by α ∈ (0, 1), and η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the
home and foreign goods indexes. Home consumer demand functions resulting from the utility
maximization yield the standard results:
cH,t = α
(
1 + piH,t
1 + pit
)−η
ct, and cF,t = (1− α)
(
1 + piF,t
1 + pit
)−η
ct (14)
where 1 + piH,t ≡ PH,t/Pt−1 and 1 + piF,t ≡ PF,t/Pt−1 represent price ination of the home
and foreign goods indexes respectively. These are derived from home and foreign price indexes
(PH,t and PF,t) and denominated in home currency. The standard pricing aggregator for the home
country allows ination to be found as the combination of home and foreign goods:
1 + pit =
[
α(1 + piH,t)
1−η + (1− α)(1 + piF,t)1−η
] 1
1−η , (15)
which is home consumer price ination (CPI). The relative demand for each good may be shown
to depend on the home terms of trade:
Tt ≡ PF,t
PH,t
, such that: cH,t
cF,t
=
α
1− αT
η
t (16)
Consumption of the home and foreign goods indexes may be decomposed further. In particu-
lar, the home and foreign goods indexes are themselves an index of diversied varieties. For
simplicity, it will be sucient to consider the case of two distinct varieties, with ω ∈ {N,E}
representing a grouping of nonexporting and exporting rms, such that:
cH,t =
(∫ 1
0
c
ν−1
ν
H,ω,t dω
) ν
ν−1
=
(
Λ
1
ν
Hc
ν−1
ν
H,N,t + (1− ΛH)
1
ν c
ν−1
ν
H,E,t
) ν
ν−1 (17)
with aggregation weight ΛH (and ΛF for the foreign country). Again, the home consumer demand
functions resulting from the utility maximization will yield the standard CES results as:
cH,N,t = ΛH
(
1 + piH,N,t
1 + piH,t
)−ν
cH,t and cH,E,t = (1− ΛH)
(
1 + piH,E,t
1 + piH,t
)−ν
cH,t (18)
where 1 + piH,ω,t ≡ PH,ω,t/Pt−1 again represents price ination in home currency terms. The
standard pricing aggregator allows the home ination index to be found as a combination of
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ination indexes for N and E varieties:
1 + piH,t =
[
ΛH(1 + piH,N,t)
1−ν + (1− ΛH)(1 + piH,E,t)1−ν
] 1
1−ν (19)
where 1 + piH,N,t ≡ PH,N,t/Pt−1 and 1 + piH,E,t ≡ PH,E,t/Pt−1. Analogous expressions apply to
the foreign country.
4.2 Firms
In this model, domestic prices are fully exible, but the exibility of internationally priced goods
depends critically on the invoicing currency assumption. Firms have a Cobb-Douglas production
function which uses labor and intermediate inputs to produce varieties of goods:
YH,ω,t = AωL
1−φω
ω,t x
φω
ω (20)
where the technology parameter, Aω, will dier across exporters and nonexporters, and the cost
minimization problem results marginal costs of the following form:
mcω,t =
w1−φωt p
φω
x,t
Aω(1− φω)1−φωφφωω
(21)
The demand for factor inputs is:
px,txω,t = φωmcω,tYH,ω,t (22)
wtLω,t = (1− φω)mcω,tYH,ω,t (23)
with the real value of prots given by:
Γω,t =
(
1 + piH,ω,t
1 + pit
−mcω,t
)
cH,ω,t +
(
Qt
1 + pi∗H,ω,t
1 + pi∗t
−mcω,t
)
c∗H,ω,t (24)
+ (Qtp
∗
x −mcω,t)x∗H,ω,t
4.2.1 Domestic pricing
Under the assumption of exible domestic price setting, rms prot maximization problem gen-
erates a standard solution with a markup above marginal costs. This basic price setting paradigm
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can be adjusted to allow for variable markups and strategic complementarities. This will be par-
ticularly important in producing a better quantitative t of the model in section 5. As in Itskhoki
and Mukhin (2017), prices are set in real terms according to the following rule:
1 + piH,ω,t
1 + pit
=
ν
ν − 1mc
1−ζ
t,ω (25)
Here, ζ ∈ [0, 1) is the strategic complementarity elasticity. Although ζ in equation 25 appears ad
hoc, it can be made consistent with a large range of price setting models, such as both monopolistic
and oligopolistic competition models under CES and non-CES demand.
4.2.2 International pricing
The international pricing block may then take one of three forms: producer currency pricing
(PCP), local currency pricing (LCP) or dollar currency pricing (DCP).31 With rm heterogene-
ity, only the most productive (ω = E) will both export and import intermediate inputs. The
international price of imported intermediates, pX and p∗X , are treated symmetrically with the
consumption good. For simplicity, p∗X is taken to be an exogenous parameter and therefore does
not depend on the pricing structure.
Under producer currency pricing (PCP), international prices obey the law of one price and
may be written as follows:
Qt
1 + pi∗H,E,t
1 + pi∗t
=
1 + piH,E,t
1 + pit
(26)
1 + piF,E,t
Qt(1 + pit)
=
1 + pi∗F,E,t
1 + pi∗t
(27)
px,t = Qtp
∗
x (28)
Under local currency pricing (LCP), exporters are assumed to permanently x price ination in
the local currency terms, allowing deviations from the law of one price:
1 + pi∗H,E,t
1 + pi∗t
= 1 + p¯i∗H,E,t =
1 + piH,E,t
Qt(1 + pit)
(29)
1 + piF,E,t
1 + pit
= 1 + p¯iF,E,t =
Qt(1 + pi
∗
F,E,t)
1 + pi∗t
(30)
px,t = p¯x,t = Qtp
∗
x (31)
31Appendix C provides more detail on how to derive the pricing equations in this section.
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Dollar currency pricing (DCP) is the hybrid case when international prices are set in dollars. This
implies the following price setting equations:
1 + pi∗H,E,t
1 + pi∗t
= 1 + p¯i∗H,E,t =
1 + piH,E,t
Qt(1 + pit)
, (32)
1 + piF,E,t
Qt(1 + pit)
=
1 + pi∗F,E,t
1 + pi∗t
, (33)
px,t = Qtp
∗
x (34)
For completeness, in the cases where rm heterogeneity is suppressed, domestic rms set inter-
national prices in precisely the same way as exporting rms, such that:
1 + pi∗H,N,t = 1 + pi
∗
H,E,t and 1 + piF,N,t = 1 + piF,E,t (35)
4.2.3 Aggregation
The nal set of equations for rms specify a series of aggregation conditions. The demand for
factor inputs, the demand for each variety, and the total demand across goods are simply:
Lt = LN,t + LE,t and xt = xN,t + xE,t (36)
YH,ω,t = cH,ω,t + c
∗
H,ω,t + x
∗
ω,t (37)
YH,t = YN,t + YE,t (38)
Two further aggregate conditions may also be dened here. First, lump sum transfers to house-
hold are given as:
Γt = ΓH,N,t + ΓH,E,t +mt − mt−1
1 + pit
(39)
where ΓH,ω,t are the prots of each rm type and the remaining terms are a result of seigniorage
revenue earned by the scal authority being returned to households. Second, the nominal value
of net exports is given by:
NXt = εtP
∗
H,tc
∗
H,t + εtP
∗
t p
∗
x,tx
∗
t − PF,tcF,t − Ptpx,txt (40)
32
Denoting the real value of net exports by nxt ≡ NXt/Pt, they can be written as:
nxt = Qt
1 + pi∗H,t
1 + pi∗t
c∗H,t +Qtp
∗
x,tx
∗
t −
1 + piF,t
1 + pit
cF,t − px,txt (41)
4.3 Monetary policy
It is assumed that the central bank in each country sets the nominal quantity of money. More
formally, an AR(1) process is assumed in the growth rate of money. For home, this implies:
∆ lnMt = (1− ρm)p˜i + ρm∆ lnMt−1 + m,t (42)
where p˜i represents the home central bank’s ination target, which is achieved through the mon-
etary growth rule. This equation embeds two attractive features. First, the impact of a one-period
shock to the growth rate of the nominal money supply will dissipate over time. Second, the per-
manent impact of a one-period shock to the growth rate, compared to a baseline scenario without
a shock, may be captured as:
lnMS∞ − lnMNS∞ =
m,t
1− ρm (43)
where MS∞ refers to the nominal money supply far in the future after a shock, and MNS∞ refers
to the nominal money supply far in the future without a shock. For the model to be stationary,
the exogenous transition equations are rewritten in real terms as:
∆ lnmt = (1− ρm)p˜i + ρm∆ lnmt−1 − pit + ρmpit−1 + m,t (44)
where the rst-order approximation, pit ≈ lnPt − lnPt−1, has been used and ∆ lnmt ≡ lnmt −
lnmt−1 is specied to remove dependence on lags of order above one.
4.4 Asset markets
The description above outlines the entire model up to the characterization of nancial asset,
which may be traded across countries in two ways described below.32
32Using the model’s predictions, Appendix C builds intuition for how the relative allocations between exporters
and nonexporters shift in the aftermath of a competitive devaluation.
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4.4.1 Complete markets
Under complete asset markets, households are able to choose a value of bt+1(st+1) for every
possible realization of shocks tomorrow st+1. The rst order conditions for real bonds are:
λt = βλt+1(st+1)
(1 + it) Pr[st+1|st]
1 + pit+1(st+1)
,
λ∗t
εt
= β
λ∗t+1(st+1)
εt+1(st+1)
(1 + it) Pr[st+1|st]
1 + pi∗t+1(st+1)
(45)
for the home and foreign country respectively, where Pr[st+1|st] denotes the probability of state
st+1, given current state st. A no arbitrage condition has also been used between investment in
home and foreign denominated nancial assets. In the description above, those equations were
only taken to hold on average across states. Taken together they imply:
Qt = κ
λ∗t
λt
, (46)
where κ ≡ Qt−1λ∗t−1/λt−1. When the cash-in-advance constraint is not operating (such that
µt = 0), the above formulation becomes Qt = λ∗t/λt = ct/c∗t .
4.4.2 Incomplete markets
Next, consider the case of cross-boarder trade in a single one-period nominal discount bond,
assumed to pay out in foreign currency (i.e., dollars). The rst order conditions for the home and
foreign country for real bond holdings become:
εtλt = βEt
[
εt+1λt+1
(1 + i∗t )
1 + pi∗t+1
]
, λ∗t = βEt
[
λ∗t+1
(1 + i∗t )
1 + pi∗t+1
]
(47)
Besides, one can deduce that:
1 = βEt
[
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
Qt
Qt+1
1 + it
1 + pit+1
]
(48)
The international risk sharing conditions for both countries become:
0 = β(1 + it)Et
[
λt+1
λt
1
1 + pit+1
− λ
∗
t+1
λ∗t
Qt
Qt+1
1
1 + pit+1
]
(49)
As discussed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), a further procedure is required to ensure sta-
tionary with incomplete international nancial asset market. Specically, the discount factor is
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replaced throughout with an ad hoc functional form as in Uzawa (1968):
β(ct) = ωSGUc
−αSGU
t , (50)
where the parameters ωSGU and αSGU are calibrated such that the endogenous discount factor
matches the choice for the exogenous discount factor, β.33 Households do not internalize the
eect of their borrowing choice on the discount factor, which is assumed to respond to aggregate
(or average) consumption choices, rather than to the choices of specic individuals.
5 Quantitative Results
This section numerically evaluates the impact of competitive devaluations on the relative per-
formance of exporters versus nonexporters and discusses aggregate implications. Outcomes are
judged against a pre-shock equilibrium for the three price setting scenarios and for varying de-
grees of intermediate import intensity. The two country framework developed in section 4 is
used to understand how international shocks are transmitted into domestic prices and quantities
in light of the rm-level reactions in section 3.2. To that end, a tightly calibrated quantitative
model that captures the cross-sectional heterogeneity observed in Japan is employed to show
how the interaction of dollar pricing and varying import intensities shapes the aggregate and
rm-level response after a competitive devaluation as observed during Abenomics.
5.1 Parameter values
Consider a representative industry with nonexporting (N) and exporting (E) rms in both coun-
tries. The sector will be calibrated to one that is typical in Japan, focusing on the domestic market
in which both local and foreign (U.S.) rms compete. The calibration can be split into three parts.
First, around half of all parameters in the model are set to standard values from the literature.
Second, a number of parameters are chosen to match empirically relevant features of the Japanese
economy. The remaining parameters are chosen to target a set of moments specic to the setup
of the benchmark model, with heterogeneous rms, strategic complementarities and imported
intermediate inputs. The results of the calibration are given in Table 4, with individual parameter
33This approach is consistent with the literature, and analogous to that followed by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2003) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008) among others.
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Table 4: Calibration values
Parameter Value Description Target
A: Literature
β 0.98 Time discount factor Standard value
η 2 Elasticity across H and F Standard value
ν 6 Elasticity across N and E Standard value
αSGU 0.02 SGU parameter Standard value
κ 1 Disutility of labour Farhi et al. (2014)
ψ−1 0.5 Frisch elasticity of labour supply Farhi et al. (2014)
φ 2 Labour substitution elasticity Standard value
1 + p˜i 1.005 Ination target (Japan) 2% (annualized)
ζ 0.40 Strategic complementarity elasticity IM (2016)
B: Empirical
α 0.93 Home bias (Japan) Japanese macro data
θ 0.90 Calvo prob. of wage stickiness Standard value
φN 0 Exchange rate exposure (nonexporters) Customs data & AIK (2014)
φE 0.4 Exchange rate exposure (exporters) Customs data & AIK (2014)
C: Targetted
ωSGU 0.97 SGU parameter β = β(ct)
AN 1.00 Productivity (nonexporters) Normalization
AE 2.35 Productivity (exporters) Normalization
p∗x 0.77 Cost-savings 20%, HKS (2015)
ΛH 0.83 Weight on nonexporting rms 25% revenue share
ΛF 0 Weight on nonexporting U.S. rms Preferences
ρm 0.87 AR(1) component of monetary growth 1 year half-life
σm 0.06 S.D. of monetary growth shocks 50% change in level
Note: Parameters shown for the benchmark case with DCP pricing, rm heterogeniety, intermediate
goods, strategic complemetarities and complete asset markets.
choices discussed next.
Most of the values taken from the literature are self-explanatory. The time period is a quarter.
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) conclude that the elasticity of demand for imports at the
sectoral level is in the range of 5 to 10. Even though the results are robust to a wide range of
parameter choices, the elasticity of substitution across home and foreign goods is set to η = 2,
and the elasticity of substitution between exporters and nonexporters is set to ν = 6, a value
near the middle of a relatively wide range of estimates found in much of the literature. The
parameter αSGU is chosen to ensure a slow convergence to a stationary equilibrium, matching the
implementation in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and a variety of related work.34 The literature
34Although αSGU = 0.01 could be used, with a 2% level of ination the dynamics of nx are too slow compared
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suggests a broad range of plausible values for the markup of real wages as a result of imperfect
competition the in labor market, with Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) using a markup
of 5% compared to a 50% markup used by Smets and Wouters (2003). Incomplete pass-through
and variable markups are introduced as in Itskhoki and Mukhin (2017) and the same elasticity of
strategic complementarities is used as in their benchmark case (ζ = 0.4).
Empirical estimates are taken from the Japanese data. The Calvo parameter governing nom-
inal wage rigidity, θ, is set to ensure slow nominal wage adjustments to shocks, which is a well-
documented fact in Japan. The home bias parameter, α, is set to 0.93 in both countries to reect
the fact that Japan and the U.S. are relatively closed economies—exports and imports each rep-
resent about 14% of GDP for Japan and the U.S., which means that the foreign share is 7% as
nal consumption is half of total imports. The exchange rate exposure across rms, φN and
φE , is calibrated using customs data and is consistent with Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014).
For nonexporting rms, φN = 0, whereas for continuing exporters, the import intensity is set to
φE = 0.4. This calibration is pivotal in matching domestic revenue and employment reallocations
across both types of rms. Import intensities are taken as xed, which is a good approximation
over horizons of 3–5 years.35
The remaining parameters are set to target model moments. The incomplete markets param-
eter, ωSGU , is used to calibrate the endogenous discount factor, in steady state, to be equal to the
time-discount factor used in the complete asset market version of the model. As discussed in
section 4, the permanent impact of a one-period shock to nominal money supply growth, com-
pared to a baseline case with no shock, is given by m,t/(1 − ρm). This quantity is set at 0.5 to
match the dynamics of quantitative easing in Japan. This calibration sets the size of the standard
deviation of m,t as σm = 0.5(1− ρm), allowing the parameter ρm to control the speed of adjust-
ment. Again, in the context of Japan’s experience, this arises quickly. More precisely, to match
the observed pace of monetary expansion, the value of ρm is determined by allowing 50% of the
total impact to arise within the rst year (four quarters). This implies:
lnMS4 − lnMNS4
lnMS∞ − lnMNS∞
=
(1 + ρm + ρ
2
m + ρ
3
m)m,t
m,t
1−ρm
= (1 + ρm + ρ
2
m + ρ
3
m)(1− ρm) = 0.5
to those of prices, resulting in a divergent series for NX .
35The exchange rate exposure term, φE , is assumed to be rm-specic and constant over time. Amiti, Itskhoki,
and Konings (2014) justify this assumption using Belgian customs data and show that rm import intensities are not
sensitive to exchange rate uctuations in the medium run.
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and therefore ρm = 0.87. The total factor productivity parameters, AN and AE , alongside
the cost-savings from imported intermediate goods, p∗x are used to give exporting rms a 20%
marginal cost advantage over purely domestic rms (as consistent with Halpern, Koren, and
Szeidl (2015)). Initially, AN is used to normalize the denominator of marginal costs, mct,N . Then,
AE is used to reduce the dierence between rms in the denominator of the marginal cost to
20%, while p∗x is used to calibrate the overall dierence in marginal costs to 20%. This procedure
achieves a dual objective of normalizing the cost-savings from importing intermediates to 20%
of costs and simultaneously retaining positive prots in equilibrium across all model formula-
tions. In this way, rms compare the xed costs of becoming exporters with the added benets
from lower marginal costs. This moment is used to target the exogenous price of imported in-
termediate goods, p∗x. The aggregation weight ΛF is set to ensure only exporters supply to the
foreign country, whereas ΛH is used to calibrate the share of domestic revenue sold by exporting
rms to 25%. This ensures a consistent comparison may be made between two rm types while
maintaining their relative revenue shares in the economy.36
5.1.1 Benchmark model
In the benchmark model, rms are heterogeneous, diering by productivity and their import
intensity, prices are set in accordance with international dollar invoicing (DCP) with strategic
complementarities, and asset markets are incomplete such that net exports are not simply pinned
down by international risk sharing. All of the key parameter values used in the benchmark ver-
sion of the model are summarized in Table 4.
Figure 6 shows the economy’s adjustment path at the micro- and macro-levels for the bench-
mark model. Panel (A) shows the simulation results for both types of rms, solely domestic (in
blue circles) and exporters (in red squares). A monetary shock relaxes the cash-in-advance con-
straint in the home country, leading to higher levels of income and consumer spending on all
goods. Greater demand increases domestic prices, while the Calvo assumption implies that the
nominal wage is sticky and labor is demand determined in the short-run. Additional labor is
hence required to meet rising aggregate demand, generating a domestic boom.37
36As mentioned in section 3.1, exporters account for 22% of domestic revenue in Japan. At the same time, Bernard
and Jensen (2004) report that the fraction of exporting plants was 21% and 30% in 1987 and 1992, respectively.
37Any framework with nominal rigidities produces a domestic boom after monetary expansions, which is not
what happened in Japan, where real GDP growth was low around 2014. However, manufacturing output reacted a
lot more to the nominal devaluation, rising by about 10% from early 2013 to mid 2014, and one could imagine a setup
where the industrial sector is subject to a binding cash-in-advance constraint while the remaining industries operate
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Figure 6: Benchmark
Note: Panel (A) displays rm-level impulse responses for nonexporters (blue circles) and exporters (in
red squares) to a one standard deviation (50%) shock to the growth rate of the home country nominal
money supply,Mt. Panel (B) shows the aggregate response. The time period is a quarter.
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Table 5: Comparison of models
Data MF Benchmark M1 M2 M3 M4
Price setting PCP DCP LCP LCP DCP DCP
Firm heterogeneity 7 3 7 3 3 3
Imported intermediate inputs 7 3 7 3 3 3
Strategic complementarities 7 3 7 7 7 3
Incomplete markets 7 3 7 7 7 7
RevH,N/RevH,E 0.07 0 0.08 0 0 0.29 0.17
LN/LE 0.06 0 0.09 0 0.04 0.26 0.14
ΓN/ΓE 0.1 0 0.04 0 -0.3 -0.02 0.05
CPI 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04
YH 0.01 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.07
NX 0 0.02 0 0 0.03 0.03 0.02
 0.25 0.28 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Note: This table lists key moments (growth rates) in the data and compares them with simulations in
dierent versions of the model. Key ingredients are added one-by-one. Each row shows the impulse
response functions of endogenous variables after 1.5 years to a (persistent) one standard deviation
(50%) shock to the level of the home country nominal money supply, Mt. Only CPI contains the
instantaneous response of the price level to a monetary shock.
The monetary expansion generates a nominal (competitive) depreciation, and feeds through
to home CPI ination. At the micro-level, nonexporting rms expand proportionally more as
they experience an increase in demand for all of their produce—given sticky international prices,
exporting rms experience a relatively small increase in demand, while domestic revenue expands
equally for both types of rms. Besides, the impact is compounded by a dierence in marginal
costs—exporting rms experience an increase in their nominal marginal costs as the home price
of imported intermediate inputs rises substantially following the home currency depreciation.
Due to these eects, both output and labor expand by more for nonexporting rms. Strategic
complementarities in price setting contribute to matching the relative output and employment
paths for both types of rms, and they are helpful in generating shrinking relative prots of
exporting rms.38
At the aggregate level, displayed in Panel (B) of Figure 6, ination increases both as a result
in a credit economy and are insensitive to monetary policy.
38Prots of exporters may increase by more as the markup on their exported intermediate inputs rises in domestic
currency terms following the home currency depreciation. Strategic complementarities mute these valuation eects
relative to the output expansion.
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of the domestic boom and because imports become relatively more expensive. As in the data, net
exports show almost no response to the depreciation since they are not determined by interna-
tional risk sharing under incomplete markets. With complete markets, a domestic boom in Japan
would require a transfer to the foreign economy.
Table 5 summarizes key moments for dierent versions of the model, and contains impulse
responses of endogenous variables after 1.5 years to a one standard deviation (50%) shock to the
level of the home nominal money supply, Mt. Only the CPI numbers contain the instantaneous
response of the price level to a monetary shock. The Mundell-Fleming case is reported in the MF
column while other ingredients are added one-by-one.39 The basic Mundell-Fleming setup fails
to explain the dynamic adjustment path of the economy at the micro and macro levels. Modifying
the framework to account for local currency pricing (LCP) in column M1 does not improve the
quantitative performance despite shutting down the expenditure switching channel and muting
the response of net exports.40
Heterogeneous import intensities together with LCP (rather than DCP) are not enough to
jointly match the cross-sectional and aggregate expansion paths either. This is can be seen in the
M2 version of the model in Table 5. The reason is simply that nominal exchange rate movements
would not inuence exporting rms’ marginal costs under LCP. It is only with international dollar
invoicing that rms are negatively aected if they import and also do not get to reap the benets
from a relative reduction in their export prices abroad.
6 Conclusion
This paper uses novel microdata to investigate how rm heterogeneity and intermediate im-
port intensities mediate the monetary transmission mechanism. Abenomics provides an innately
suited natural experiment to isolate the eects of competitive devaluations not just on rm dy-
namics but also on aggregate outcomes. Empirical tests show that, contrary to standard theories,
exporters shrink relative to nonexporters in terms of their employment, domestic revenue and
39See Appendix D for a more comprehensive discussion of the quantitative results in the Mundell-Fleming case.
40The real value of net exports depends on two factors—relative prices and quantities. Although the relative price
of imports is left unchanged for the home country in model M1, a greater amount is demanded in real terms due to the
domestic income eect. Imports in the home country therefore increase. For foreign consumers, the relative price of
the home export good is also unchanged, and the quantity demanded is also unchanged. However, in home country
terms, the value of these exports is now higher due to the depreciation, and thus real-valued exports increase. These
eects oset one another and leave the real value of net exports unaltered.
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protability while the trade balance remains unaected. Unique Russian customs data allows for
a direct examination of the channel and conrm the same transmission as for Japan.
Conventional open economy macro models are too simplistic in their microstructure to ex-
plain these ndings. This paper develops a theoretical framework to make sense of the empiri-
cal regularities and the mechanism of competitive devaluations. A New Keynesian two-country
model that is augmented by three key ingredients from international trade—heterogeneous rms,
varying imported input intensities, and international dollar pricing—is successful in matching the
main cross-sectional patterns and the evolution of ination and net exports. The quantitative t
is greatly improved by a fourth ingredient that has been prominent in studies of exchange rate
pass-through—strategic complementarities in rm price setting.
This paper is the rst to use microdata to study the transmission mechanisms of currency
wars. The results suggest that such exchange rate policies work more through import substi-
tution rather than the promotion of national export champions, thereby stimulating a dierent
set of rms than suggested by conventional wisdom. With international dollar invoicing, the
U.S. reaps additional benets through its insulation from other countries’ nominal devaluations,
while expansionary monetary policy in the rest of the world shifts resources toward less produc-
tive nonexporting rms.
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Online Appendix: Not For Publication
A Data
This list includes the main variables used throughout the analysis. For Japan, all components are
drawn from the merged Worldscope (WS), Capital IQ, and ORBIS annual and segment les. For
Russia, all rm-level data comes from Amadeus and is merged with information on imports from
the Federal Customs Service of Russia. Variables are listed in alphabetical order.
• Agei,t: Either as reported, or inferred from the date of incorporation.
• Assetsi,t: Total assets, as reported in the respective data sets.
• Cash/Assetsi,t: Cash and equivalents divided by assets.
• Employmenti,t: The number of both full and part time workers.
• ICj: Import content of production for any given STAN industry j (OECD).
• Impinti: The share of imported intermediate inputs in total variable costs in 2013 (Russia).
• Leveragei,t: Total debt as a % of assets.
• Market Capitalizationi,t: Market price at year end · common shares outstanding.
• PBi,t: Market-to-book ratio, calculated as: [market value of common equity + assets + book
value of common equity)]/ assets.
• Revenuei,t: Total domestic revenues in either Japan or Russia.
• ROAi,t: Return on assets (protability ratio), measured as: (net income / assets).
• Sizei,t: Natural logarithm of assets.
A documented problem with ORBIS data is that variables, such as employment, are missing
once the data are downloaded. There are many reasons for this. Employment, for instance, is
not reported as a balance sheet item but in memo lines. Less often, there can be other missing
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variables such as capital or assets. Variables are not always reported consistently throughout
time in a particular disk or in a web download, either from the BvD or the Wharton Research
Data Services (WRDS) website. BvD has a policy by which rms that do not report during a
certain period are automatically removed from later vintages, creating an articial survivorship
bias in the sample. An additional issue is that any online download (BvD or WRDS) will cap
the number of rms that can be downloaded in a given period of time. This cap translates into
missing observations in the actual download task rather than termination of the request.
I implement a comprehensive data collection procedure to address these problems and maxi-
mize the coverage of rms and variables for Japan over time.41 The general strategy is to merge
data for Japan by downloading them from the ORBIS interface in limited search requests and
making sure no information on employment or assets is discarded throughout the process.
41Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, Villegas-Sanchez, Volosovych, and Yesiltas (2015) oer a detailed analysis of how to
construct representative rm-level data using the ORBIS data set.
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B Reduced Form Evidence
B.0.1 Identication
Previous literature has established the centrality of imported intermediate inputs to the produc-
tion processes of large exporting rms (Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014)). Despite the lack of
access to Japan’s rm-level customs data (as opposed to Russia), insights into the driving forces
behind the growth (or contraction) of exporters relative to nonexporters following Abenomics
can be gained with a triple dierence identication strategy.
In particular, non-nancial industries are heterogeneously reliant on imported intermediate
inputs in production. As a result, one should expect to see more pronounced dierences across
continuing exporters and solely domestic rms in sectors that are more dependent on imported
intermediate inputs than in industries, which are not. Since exporters are also the biggest im-
porters (as seen in customs data), disparities between both groups of rms are bound to be par-
ticularly stark in sectors where exporters are most sensitive to changing imported input prices
rather than in industries where almost all factors of production are obtained domestically. That
reasoning motivates the following triple dierence specication:
log(Yi,t) = αi + α
′
1Xi,t + α
′
2(Xi,t ·QEt) + β1(Treati ·QEt) + β2(ICj ·QEt) (B.1)
+ γ(Treati · ICj ·QEt) + νi,t
where, as earlier, Yit are either domestic revenue, employment, or protability of company i in
year t, αi are rm xed eects, Xi,t is a matrix of controls, Treati is an indicator variable equal
to 1 whenever a rm is a Japanese exporter, QEt is an indicator equal to zero in 2012 before
Abenomics and unity after Abenomics in either 2014 or 2015, and ICj is the import content of
production across various industries based on Japan’s 2011 input-output tables.42 An attractive
feature of this measure is that it allows one to compute the value of imported inputs used indirectly
in production of a good. That is, imported inputs may be used in one sector, whose outputs are
42This number represents the degree of vertical specialization and measures the contribution that imports make
in the production of goods in a certain industry. It is calculated as follows for country i:
ICi =
u′Am(I −Ad)−1q
qi
,
where Ad and Am are input-output coecient matrices, q is the consumption vector for each sector, qi is total
consumption for country i, and u is a vector of ones. For sector j, the imported input share of gross output can be
obtained from the individual columns of matrix u′Am(I −Ad).
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employed in another sector, then a third, and eventually become embodied in a nal good.43 Note
that the terms Treati, ICj , and Treati ·ICj are not explicitly thrown into the regression because
of the inclusion of rm xed eects. All standard errors are clustered at the rm-level to allow
for serial correlation across time.
The coecient of interest is γ as it captures the percentage change in the respective outcome
variable after Abenomics for exporting or nonexporting rms in import reliant versus less import
dependent sectors. A positive coecient would imply that, all else equal, Japan’s competitive
devaluation leads to a stronger expansion of exporters relative to nonexporters in sectors that
are more exposed to importing.
This triple dierence methodology is applied to the pooled sample of private and public rms,
and it is further extended to emulate regression 1 in accounting for the timing of any eects. That
is, the following xed-eects equation is estimated to test whether the gaps between exporters
and nonexporters widen after the introduction of Abenomics rather than before:
log(Yi,t) = αi + θ
′Xi,t +
∑
t
γtDt +
∑
t
δt (Dt ·Xi,t) +
∑
t
ψt (Dt · Treati) (B.2)
+
∑
t
λt (Dt · ICj) +
∑
t
ζt (Dt · Treati · ICj) + i,t
∀i, ∀t ∈ {2010, . . . , 2015} \ {2012}
where all of the main variables and interaction terms are as before, and standard errors are clus-
tered at the rm-level to allow for serial correlation across time. The only novelty is that now
the parameters of interest are ζt, as they measure the dierence between exporters and purely
domestic rms over time in more versus less import reliant industries. This regression tests if the
eects grow or fade, providing evidence of the validity of the parallel trends assumption.
B.0.2 Results
There is substantial heterogeneity across non-nancial sectors in terms of their import reliance.
Table 1 shows that the sectoral import content of production measure, IC , has a mean of 11.36%
and a standard deviation of 4.61%. Given that exporters are also the biggest importers, one should
expect to see larger dierences across purely domestic rms (nonimporters) and continuing ex-
43The results are insensitive to using the direct or indirect measure of import dependence since the ranking be-
tween industries remains completely unaltered with either approach.
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porters (importers) within industries that are more dependent on imported inputs.
Table B.1 presents the estimation results for regression model B.1 using the whole sample of
public and private rms. The rst two columns consider the treatment eect on employment,
and the last two columns use domestic revenue as the outcome variable. Furthermore, regression
results in columns (2) and (4) include all the main rm-level control variables as well as their in-
teraction terms with the Abenomics indicator in the specications. This tests whether any results
can be attributed to a heterogeneous reaction across rms of a highly dierent nature to Japan’s
large monetary stimulus rather than the treatment allocation. Across all specications, the es-
timated triple dierence parameter, γˆ, is negative and robustly statistically signicant. The lack
of explanatory power in rms’ export treatment status beyond its interaction term with sectoral
import dependence, as reected by the statistical insignicance of the estimated β1 coecients,
implies that all of the main results from before were driven by the variation in import intensities
across exporting and nonexporting rms.
Table B.1: Mechanism
log(employment) log(domestic revenue)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treati · ICj ·QEt -0.004** -0.004** -0.004*** -0.004***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Treati ·QEt 0.020 0.025 -0.004 -0.009
[0.035] [0.035] [0.030] [0.030]
ICj ·QEt -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
QEt 3 3 3 3
Xi,t 7 3 7 3
Xi,t ·QEt 7 3 7 3
Firm FE 3 3 3 3
Observations 61,832 61,832 61,832 61,832
Number of rms 30,916 30,916 30,916 30,916
R2 0.074 0.076 0.529 0.535
Note: This table presents triple-dierence estimates of the response of employment and domestic
revenue for exporters versus nonexporters conditional on operating in dierentially import reliant
industries. The controls in Xi,t include size (log total assets), leverage, and the cash-to-assets ratio.
Those variables are also interacted with the Abenomics (QEt) time indicator. Standard errors [in
brackets] are clustered at the rm-level to allow for serial correlation across time. ***, **, * indicate
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Panel (A) of Figure B.1 extends this analysis of the mechanism by using repeated observations
for the same company over time and shows the estimated coecient plots for ζt in specica-
tion B.2. As before, this methodology scrutinizes the causal interpretation of the results. Con-
sistent with the parallel trends assumption, the estimates show no robust dierences between
exporters and nonexporters in the years prior to Abenomics across industries sourcing inter-
mediate inputs from abroad in varying degrees. After the policy, continuing exporters begin to
shrink in terms of their domestic revenue and employment relative to nonexporting rms.44 The
magnitudes of the results are similar to the ones in Table B.1, and still manage to yield statistically
signicant results at the 10% level for both domestic revenue and employment by 2014.45 Given
the lack of rm-level customs data for Japan—which would make it possible to investigate the
channel directly as for Russia—and because input-output measures for sectoral import reliance
are noisy, the strength and robustness of those ndings are remarkable.
44Analogous results can be obtained by dening a discrete measure of imported input reliance. Sectors belonging
to the upper quintile of the import content of production distribution are then taken to be “import intensive”, and
industries in the lower quintile are “unintensive”. By way of this approach, the gaps between nonexporters and
exporters widen only in the import intensive industries.
45The results are statistically signicant at the 5% level for both domestic revenue and employment in 2015.
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Figure B.1: Mechanism
Note: Panel (A) plots the estimated ζt coecients of equation B.2 for employment and domestic
revenue as outcome variables with 95% condence intervals. Panel (B) shows the 8-year yield on
JGBs—a heavily targeted security class during QE—alongside the USDJPY exchange rate. Time is
yearly and the vertical red line marks the beginning of Abenomics.
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C Model
This section rst builds intuition for how the relative allocations between exporters and non-
exporters shift in the aftermath of a competitive devaluation, focusing on the domestic revenue
ratio of those rms. Details on the derivation of the pricing equations are also provided.
C.1 Relative expansion paths
After a shock, the relative response of marginal costs are key to determining the diering expan-
sion paths. Specically:
mcN,t
mcE,t
= Θ
(
wt
px,t
)φE−φN
where Θ ≡ AE(1 − φE)(1−φE)φφEE /AN(1 − φN)(1−φN )φφNN is a constant depending on relative
productivities. The relative expansion path for prices may then be found as:
PH,N,t
PH,E,t
=
(
mcN,t
mcE,t
)1−τ
= Θ1−τ
(
wt
px,t
)(φE−φN )(1−τ)
which, in turn, may be used to determine the relative expansion path for domestic revenue:
PH,N,tcH,N,t
PH,E,tcH,E,t
=
ΛH
1− ΛH
(
PH,N,t
PH,E,t
)1−ν
=
ΛH
1− ΛH Θ
(1−τ)(1−ν)
(
wt
px,t
)(φE−φN )(1−τ)(1−ν)
where the term ΛH/(1−ΛH) is a normalization within each sector to average rm size. Dening
the log ratio of revenues as:
∆Rev,t ≡ ln
(
PH,N,tcH,N,t
PH,E,tcH,E,t
)
and Θ˜ = ln
(
ΛH
1− ΛH Θ
(1−τ)(1−ν)
)
one can obtain:
∂∆Rev,t
∂ ln εt
= (φE − φN)(1− τ)(1− ν)Θ˜
[
∂ lnWt
∂ ln εt
− ∂ lnPx,t
∂ ln εt
]
Together, the rst terms are clearly negative as Θ˜ > 0, φE > φN and τ < 1, and ν > 1 is assumed.
The sign of this expression is then determined by the relative balance between (sticky) nominal
wages and the price of intermediate goods, which depends on the international pricing scheme.
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In an environment with dollar currency pricing (DCP), ∂ lnPx,t/∂ ln εt = 1 as the nominal price
of intermediate goods is set in the foreign country terms. Then, given suciently sticky nominal
wages, one can be assured that:
∂∆Rev,t
∂ ln εt
< 0
such that a competitive devaluation leads to a relative expansion of the (less productive) nonex-
porting rms. Nominal wages are deemed suciently sticky if ∂ lnWt/∂ ln εt < 1, such that the
exchange rate moves by more.
C.2 Pricing equations
This section provides an example of the derivation of the pricing equations. The exposition begins
with a standard equation for the reset price:46
Et
∞∑
s=t
ϑs−t
(
PtCt
PsCs
)
P νH,s(CH,s + C
∗
H,s)
[
P¯H,t − ν
ν − 1MCs
]
= 0
P¯H,t =
ν
ν − 1
Et
[∑∞
s=t ϑ
s−tβs−t
(
PtCt
PsCs
)
P νH,s(CH,s + C
∗
H,s)MCs
]
Et
[∑∞
s=t ϑ
s−tβs−t
(
PtCt
PsCs
)
P νH,s(CH,s + C
∗
H,s)
]
P¯H,t =
ν
ν − 1
J1,H,t
J2,H,t
J1,H,t = P
ν
H,t(CH,t + C
∗
H,t)MCt + ϑβEt
[
PtCt
Pt+1Ct+1
J1,H,t+1
]
J2,H,t = P
ν
H,t(CH,t + C
∗
H,t) + ϑβEt
[
PtCt
Pt+1Ct+1
J2,H,t+1
]
P¯H,t
Pt−1
=
ν
ν − 1
J1,H,t/P
ν+1
t−1
J2,H,t/P νt−1
J1,H,t
P ν+1t−1
=
(
PH,t
Pt−1
)ν
(CH,t + C
∗
H,t)
MCt
Pt−1
+ ϑβEt
[
PtCt
Pt+1Ct+1
P ν+1t
P ν+1t−1
J1,H,t+1
P ν+1t
]
J2,H,t
P νt−1
=
(
PH,t
Pt−1
)ν
(CH,t + C
∗
H,t) + ϑβEt
[
PtCt
Pt+1Ct+1
P νt
P νt−1
J2,H,t+1
P νt
]
1 + p¯iH,t =
ν
ν − 1
j1,H,t
j2,H,t
j1,H,t = (1 + piH,t)
ν(CH,t + C
∗
H,t)mct + ϑβEt
[
(1 + pit)
ν+1Ct
(1 + pit+1)Ct+1
j1,H,t+1
]
46See, for example, equation 13 in Farhi, Gopinath, and Itskhoki (2014)
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j2,H,t = (1 + piH,t)
ν(CH,t + C
∗
H,t) + ϑβEt
[
(1 + pit)
νCt
(1 + pit+1)Ct+1
j2,H,t+1
]
Simplifying:
PH,t(i) =
ν
ν − 1MCt(i)
→ PH,t(i)
Pt
Pt−1
Pt−1
=
ν
ν − 1
MCt(i)
Pt
→ 1 + piH,t(i)
1 + pit
=
ν
ν − 1mct(i)
εtP
∗
H,t(i) =
ν
ν − 1MCt(i)
→ εtP
∗
H,t(i)
Pt
P ∗t
P ∗t
P ∗t−1
P ∗t−1
=
ν
ν − 1
MCt(i)
Pt
→ Qt
1 + pi∗H,t(i)
1 + pi∗t
=
ν
ν − 1mct(i)
Also:
PH,t(i) =
ν
ν − 1MCt(i) = εtP
∗
H,t
1 + piH,t(i)
1 + pit
=
ν
ν − 1mct(i) = Qt
1 + pi∗H,t(i)
1 + pi∗t
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D Quantitative Results
D.1 Mundell–Fleming environment
To study competitive devaluations in the Mundell–Fleming (or Obstfeld–Rogo) environment,
the following parameter values are imposed: all rms are homogeneous and participate in ex-
porting (ΛH = ΛF = Λ∗H = Λ∗F = 0.5; φN = φE), there are no imported intermediate inputs
in production (φN = φE = 0), and price setting conforms to the standard PCP constant markup
version of the model with no strategic complementarities (ζ = 0).
Figure D.1 plots the economy’s rm-level and aggregate response to a one standard deviation
(50%) shock to the growth rate of the home country nominal money supply, Mt, as observed in
Japan from late 2012 until 2015.47
The initial monetary shock again translates into a nominal depreciation. Under PCP with
exible domestic prices, imports become relatively more expensive while exports become rela-
tively cheap. This causes expenditure switching for consumers in both countries. Overall, there
is greater demand for home products and the demand for labor increases further. Ination in the
home country increases as both piH and piF rise. The real wage falls, as ination increases faster
than the impact from piH alone (which is itself comprised of only the impact from nominal wage
adjustments), which means a reduction in marginal costs and rising prots.
The real value of net exports depends on two factors—relative prices and quantities. For the
home country, the positive income eect which increases home consumption of foreign goods,
CF , is outweighed by the negative substitution eect from the large real depreciation. As such,
home consumption of foreign goods, CF , falls. For foreign consumers, the price of the home
export goods falls and so more of C∗H is demanded. Home exports therefore increase and this
leads to an overall increase in the trade balance.
47In this version of the model, there are no dierences between exporters and nonexporters and hence the impulse
response functions for both types of rms are exactly on top of each other in Panel (A).
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(A) Firm-level patterns
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(B) Aggregate patterns
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Figure D.1: Mundell–Fleming
Note: Panel (A) displays rm-level impulse responses to a one standard deviation (50%) shock to the
growth rate of the home country nominal money supply, Mt. Panel (B) shows the aggregate price
and trade balance response. The time period is a quarter.
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